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Private equity (PE) ownership has become commonplace within the US, and is increasing its 
presence across Europe and Asia. However, there is still some debate over the impact of PE 
acquisitions on firms and the channel through which these affect organizations. Davis et al (2014) 
suggest that PE acquisitions in the US increase firm-level productivity by expanding productive 
plants and contracting unproductive plants, suggesting superior managerial skills around 
investment and plant selection. Similarly, Bernstein and Sheen (2014) examine the effect of 
restaurant chain buyouts in Florida and report significant improvements in store-level operational 
practices in chain-owned stores relative to franchised locations, where presumably private equity 
owners had more limited influence. However, Smith (2014) uses Indian data to suggest that PE 
selects already productive firms and provides them with financial support to grow, providing no 
post-takeover improvement in performance or management. Lerner, Leamon and Hardymon 
(2012) present a longer discussion of the mixed evidence. 
In this paper we peer inside the black box of PE ownership, by examining the association between 
PE ownership and management practices. We do this by using a management evaluation score 
developed in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and extended in Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen 
(2015). In summary, we find that PE owned firms are typically well managed. They have 
significantly better management practices than almost all other ownership groups such as family-
run, founder owned or government owned firms. The only exceptions are dispersed shareholder 
firms (e.g. publicly listed firms) and family firms run by external (non-family) CEOs, which have 
similar levels of our management score to PE owned firms. This correlation is robust to controlling 
for observable aspects of the firm such as size and industry. It also holds both in developed and 
less developed economies, suggesting PE ownership is associated with superior management 
regardless of the particular country. PE ownership is linked in particular with improved monitoring 
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and operational practices – the collection and use of data associated with modern management 
technologies such as Lean manufacturing. PE owned firms also show stronger performance related 
incentive practices, but this advantage is smaller. Finally, PE ownership is also associated with 
greater delegation of authority to plant managers, especially in demand related activities such as 
sales and marketing and new product introductions. 
One note of caution is that, because of the cross-sectional nature of our data, we cannot 
distinguish selection from treatment effects. That is, the superior management of PE owned firms 
could come entirely from purchasing well-managed firms, rather than improving firms’ 
management over time. While this is possible, we think it is unlikely to fully explain our results 
because in the US and UK the common perception is that PE firms look for badly managed targets 
to acquire for performance turnaround, implying negative selection effects. 
I Measuring Management 
We use a “double-blind” management survey developed in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). In 
summary – with full details in Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2014) – we collect information on 
18 dimensions of firms’ management grouped into three areas: (A) performance monitoring 
(information collection and analysis); (B) effective targets (using stretching short and long run 
targets); and (C) performance incentives (rewarding high-performing employees, and retraining or 
moving underperformers). In a separate part of the survey, we also collect information on the 
extent to which plant managers can make autonomous decisions (i.e. without their corporate 
headquarters approval, see Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen 2012 for details). 
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One part of the double-blind methodology is that our interviewers are not told anything 
about the financial performance of the firms they interview. They are simply given the firms’ 
names and telephone numbers, making them ‘performance blind’ as they generally have not heard 
of the medium-sized companies we survey.  The second part of the double-blind technique is that 
the managers we interview are not informed that they are being scored. To achieve this, we score 
management using a predefined practice grid provided by a leading international consultancy 
company and open-ended questions. Having interviewers ‘performance blind’ and managers 
‘scoring blind’ helps to minimize any potential bias in the survey. The 18 individual management 
dimensions are averaged into one overall management score after they have each been normalized 
to z-scores (a mean of zero and a standard-deviation of one). 
Over multiple survey waves since 2004 we have collected management practice scores 
from over 15,000 interviews in over 10,000 manufacturing plants across 34 countries, which we 
analyze in this paper.1 These firms are randomly drawn from the population of all firms – both 
public and private – with 50 to 5,000 employees in each country we survey. The sample of 
countries – which is chosen both by economic size (i.e. we targeted large economics like the US 
and China) as well as regional representation - is shown in Table 1. This reports the number of 
firms in each country, alongside the number and share that are PE owned. One striking finding is 
the spread of PE ownership around the world. While it is unsurprisingly to see over 5% of plants 
owned by PE in Northern Europe and North America, we also see PE ownership rates above 1% 
in most of Asia, South American and even African countries. So while PE ownership may be rare 
in those countries, it still occurs on a regular basis.  
                                                 
1 There are some multiple interviews of firms, mainly because we built in a panel element, following the same firms 
over time. A full replication file is available at http://www.stanford.edu/~nbloom/PE.zip  
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Table 1: Private Equity Ownership Across Our Sample 
Country All Firms PE Firms PE Share 
Argentina 566 4 0.71% 
Australia 470 15 3.19% 
Brazil 1,145 11 0.96% 
Canada 418 33 7.89% 
Chile 544 8 1.47% 
China 761 1 0.13% 
Colombia 170 3 1.76% 
Ethiopia 131 0 0.00% 
France 751 36 4.79% 
Germany 685 29 4.23% 
Ghana 107 3 2.80% 
Greece 585 7 1.20% 
India 921 2 0.22% 
Italy 628 20 3.18% 
Japan 172 0 0.00% 
Kenya 184 3 1.63% 
Mexico 524 5 0.95% 
Mozambique 109 5 4.59% 
Myanmar 146 1 0.68% 
New Zealand 149 8 5.37% 
Nicaragua 97 1 1.03% 
Nigeria 118 0 0.00% 
Poland 364 10 2.75% 
Portugal 410 7 1.71% 
Republic of Ireland 161 5 3.11% 
Singapore 373 0 0.00% 
Spain 213 8 3.76% 
Sweden 377 44 11.67% 
Tanzania 150 1 0.67% 
Turkey 332 15 4.52% 
United Kingdom 1,618 108 6.67% 
United States 1,516 71 4.68% 
Vietnam 76 0 0.00% 
Zambia 68 1 1.47% 
Total 15,038 465 3.09% 
Notes: Private Equity ownership across our random sample (50 to 5000 employee) of manufacturing firms.  
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To validate the accuracy of the management scoring we carry out two pieces of analysis 
(see Bloom et al. 2014 for details). First, we re-interview 222 firms using both a different 
interviewer and a different plant manager at the same firm, finding scores have a correlation of 
0.51 (p-value <0.001). This suggests our management scores are consistently measuring firm-level 
practices. Second, we match our management practice data to firm-level performance indicators 
from independently collected company accounts, such as productivity, profitability, sales growth 
and Tobin’s Q. We find that better management practices are strongly correlated with these 
independently collected firm performance measures in every region we interviewed. For example, 
a one unit increase in our management practice score is associated with a 15% increase in 
productivity, a 34% increase in size and a 4% increase in employment growth rates. 
II Management Practices in Private Equity Firms 
In Figure 1 we plot the distribution of management practices across PE owned firms (blue solid 
line), dispersed shareholders (dotted red line), family owned and managed firms (hatched green 
line) and all other firms except PE (yellow dash line). Three results are clear. First, PE firms have 
generally a superior distribution of management practices compared to other firms. Second, PE 
firms have a particularly large advantage over family firms, a group we focus on because they 
represent the most common target group for PE firms in developing countries. Third, PE firms 
have similar management practices to dispersed shareholder (publicly listed) firms, a group which 
are frequently the source of acquisitions in developed countries like the US and UK. 
Figure 1: The distribution of management scores across ownership types 
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Note: The kernel distribution of management practice scores for 15,038 firms, of which 465 are owned by PE, 4,076 
by dispersed shareholders (publicly listed) and 2,539 by family and have a (second or greater) generation family CEO. 
In Figure 2 below we show the ranking of PE firms by management practices against a 
wide-range of ownership types. The solid black bars plot this data using the raw management 
scores. In the raw data, apart from dispersed shareholders (e.g. publicly listed firms), PE ownership 
tops the ranking. The grey bars just below plot this data after controlling for country and industry 
dummies. A similar ranking persists even within the same country and industry, although PE 
owned firms now appear to be slightly below family firms run by external (i.e. non-family) CEOs 
(the difference between the two is not significant). 
Figure 2: Average management scores across ownership types 
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Notes: Management scores for 15,038 firms. Raw data and with country and 3-digit SIC industry controls.  
To further investigate the management practices advantage of PE firms Table 2 runs a 
regression of management practices on ownership type and an increasing number of controls. In 
column (1) we regress management practices on a set of ownership dummies with PE as the 
omitted base. We find that PE owned firms have significantly higher management scores than 
every other type of ownership group apart from than dispersed shareholders. In many cases this 
gap is large – for example, PE firms have a raw management gap with family owned, family CEO 
firms of 0.652, which based on the association between management and performance quoted 
above, would be associated with about a 10% productivity gap and a 3% growth rate gap. In 
columns (2) and (3) we include a set of country and industry dummies and our ownership rankings 
are pretty stable. Finally, in column (4) we include a full set of firm controls for size, age and 
skills, plus a set of survey noise controls like interviewer dummies and interview duration controls. 
While some of the management gaps between ownership types shrink somewhat – mainly because 
we have controlled for firm size and employee skills which are partly outcome variables (well 
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managed firms are likely to grow faster and be able to hire more skilled employees) – we still see 
PE firms have significantly higher management scores than most other ownership groups.  
Table 2: Management practices score by ownership type compared to Private Equity 
 Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) 
 Management Score    
Founder -0.854*** -0.480*** -0.323*** 
  (0.046) (0.045) (0.039) 
Family CEO -0.652*** -0.430*** -0.320*** 
  (0.047) (0.045) (0.039) 
Family ownership, External CEO -0.127** 0.020 -0.034 
  (0.055) (0.052) (0.045) 
Dispersed Shareholders 0.097** 0.135*** 0.061 
  (0.045) (0.043) (0.037) 
Private Individuals -0.449*** -0.237*** -0.137*** 
  (0.046) (0.044) (0.038) 
Government -0.619*** -0.284*** -0.322*** 
  (0.068) (0.068) (0.060) 
Other -0.276*** -0.099** -0.102** 
  (0.053) (0.050) (0.044) 
Managers -0.272*** -0.242*** -0.119* 
  (0.075) (0.071) (0.063) 
Observations 15,038 15,038 15,038 
Country and Industry dummies No Yes Yes 
Firm and noise controls No No Yes 
Notes: Dependent variable is the management z-score (mean zero and standard deviation of one), with PE ownership 
the omitted category. Standard errors clustered at the company level. Industry controls are three-digit SIC industry 
dummies. Firm controls are employment, age, and the proportion of employees with a degree. “Noise” controls include 
the duration of the interview, an interviewee dummy and an interview reliability score.  
Finally, Table 3 examines PE ownership by type of management practice, breaking this 
into the three groups we outlined above: monitoring, targets and incentives. For each of the three 
areas we compare PE owned firms to all other firms including the same set of country, industry, 
firm and noise controls used in Table 2. We find that PE firms appear to have a particularly large 
gap in monitoring practices. These are the type of “Lean” manufacturing practices around 
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continuous performance measurement, improvement and feedback that originates in world-class 
firms like Toyota. Table 3 shows that PE firms are also relatively strong at setting effective targets, 
which involves setting stretching but realistic targets across the whole firm, with these targets 
matching up in the short and long run. Finally, while unconditionally PE firms do have better 
incentives over linking pay, promotion and continued employment to the effort and ability, when 
we include a full set of country, firm, industry and noise controls, the difference with other 
ownership becomes insignificant.  
In the last column of Table 3 we examine whether PE firms also differ in terms of the 
decision making authority allocated to the plant manager. This decentralization index records the 
extent to which the plant manager can make autonomous decisions in terms of hiring, investment, 
sales/marketing and product introduction initiatives. We find that PE firm provide greater 
autonomy to their plant managers. PE firms appear to be more decentralized relative to other 
ownership types in terms of decisions related to sales/marketing and product introduction, while 
the difference is insignificant with respect to hiring and capital decisions.2  
Table 3: PE management practice gap by type of practice and decentralization 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable Operations Targets Incentives Decentralization:  
Hiring & 
Investment 
Decentralization:  
Sales, Marketing 
& New Products 
Private Equity Ownership 0.147*** 0.090** 0.027 -0.020 0.114** 
  (0.037) (0.037) (0.043) (0.037) (0.058) 
                                                 
2 In other work (Aghion, Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2015) we show evidence that plant manager autonomy 
(especially in terms of sales/marketing and product introduction) played a key role in moderating the negative impact 
of the Great Recession on firm growth.  
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Notes:  All columns include country, industry, firm and noise controls. Standard errors clustered by firm.  
REFERENCES:  
Aghion, Philippe, Bloom, Nicholas, Sadun, Raffaella, and John Van Reenen. 2015. “Never 
Waste  a Good Crisis? Growth and Decentralization in the Great Recession,” Stanford mimeo. 
Bernstein, Shai and Steen, Albert 2015, “The operational consequences of Private Equity 
Buyouts: Evidence from the Restaurant Industry”, Stanford mimeo. 
Bloom, Nicholas, and John Van Reenen. 2007. “Measuring and Explaining Management 
Practices across Firms and Countries”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4), 1341-1408. 
Bloom, Nicholas, Lemos, Renata, Sadun, Raffaella, Scur, Daniela, and John Van Reenen. 
2014. “The new empirical economics of management”, Journal of the European Economic 
Association, 12(4), pp.835-876. 
Bloom, Nicholas, Sadun, Raffaella, and John Van Reenen. 2013. “The Organization of Firms 
across Countries”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(4), 1663-1705. 
Bloom, Nicholas, Sadun, Raffaella, and John Van Reenen. 2015. “Management as a 
technology,” Stanford mimeo. 
Davis, Steve, Haltiwanger, John, Handley, Kyle, Jarmin, Ron, Lerner, Josh & Javier 
Miranda 2014. “Private equity, jobs and productivity”, American Economic Review, 104(12). 
Lerner, Josh, Leamon, Ann and Felda Hardymon. 2012, Venture Capital, Private Equity and 
the Financing of Entrepreneurship, Wiley, New Jersey, USA. 
Smith, Troy. 2015. Private equity investment in India: Efficiency vs Expansion”, Stanford mimeo.  
